The Politics of Transparency and Independence before Administrative Boards by Sossin, Lorne & Smith, Charles W.
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University 
Osgoode Digital Commons 
Articles & Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship 
2012 
The Politics of Transparency and Independence before 
Administrative Boards 
Lorne Sossin 
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, lsossin@osgoode.yorku.ca 
Charles W. Smith 
Source Publication: 
Saskatchewan Law Review. Volume 75, Issue 1 (2012), p. 13-54. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 4.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Sossin, Lorne, and Charles W. Smith. "The Politics of Transparency and Independence before 
Administrative Boards." Saskatchewan Law Review 75.1 (2012): 13-54. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It 




The Politics of Transparency and
Independence before Administrative
Boards
Lorne Sossin & Charles W Smith*
I. INTRODUCTION
This study is about the need for transparency and independence
in the conduct and functioning of administrative agencies, boards,
and commissions. In liberal democracies, administrative bodies
perform significant statutory functions in order to fulfil public
policy goals, and have a mandate to act in the public interest. In
order for administrative boards to fulfil this obligation, transparency
and independence are essential. Although adjudicative independence
recognizes the need for deliberative secrecy, a concern for confidentiality
need not and should not characterize an administrative tribunal's
conduct with government, stakeholders, or other parties. However,
as we argue in this study, the principles of transparency and
independence do not always mesh with the role that administrative
tribunals, such as labour boards, maintain in the policy-making
process. Given this reality, we question if administrative tribunals
should play a role not just in implementing policy (through regulatory
and adjudicatory activities) but also in serving to shape that policy.
The problem is exacerbated by the tense and often contested relationship
between a board's independence and a government's prerogative
not just to shape the legislation and policy (which provides mandates
to administrative agencies) but also to appoint decision-makers to
administrative agencies. To that end, what is the appropriate relationship
between an administrative tribunal's capacity to shape policy and a
government's ability to appoint tribunal members it believes to be
Lorne Sossin, Faculty of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School; Charles W. Smith,
Department of Political Studies, St. Thomas More College, University of
Saskatchewan.
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aligned with its priorities? This question leads to a broader one:
Should tribunals be shaped through government appointments and
policy mandates in an effort to conform to the government of the
day's policy outlook?
We highlight two case studies in an effort to examine the tension
between administrative transparency and independence and the
role of tribunals in the larger policy process. The first case study is a
dispute between the Alberta Labour Relations Board (ALRB) and a
group of unions who challenged the role the ALRB played in the
development of labour legislation. The second is a dispute in
Saskatchewan between a newly elected government and its attempt
to remake the Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board (SLRB) by
removing and appointing new members in accordance with the new
government's political and economic agenda. In a sense, these two
cases present cautionary tales at the opposite ends of the spectrum
in terms of relationships between administrative tribunals and
government: in Alberta, the problem was a board alleged to be too
close to the government of the day; while in Saskatchewan, the problem
was a board alleged to be hostile to a newly elected government. In
both cases, we believe the issue of the Board's proper role lay at the
heart of the political and legal dispute, and better understanding
that role sheds important light on our political and legal systems. In
each case, we believe the justification for greater transparency and
independence is well demonstrated.
The balance of this study is divided into two sections. In the
first section, we explore the cautionary tales alluded to above. In the
second section, we use those cautionary tales as a point of departure
for a broader discussion regarding the role of boards and tribunals
within government. We then offer our conclusions as to the proper
balance between transparency and independence on the one hand,
and the ability of these institutions to play a legitimate and constructive
role in the policy process on the other hand.
II. TWO CAUTIONARY TALES
We begin our analysis, as indicated above, with two cautionary tales.
The first case study examines a dispute between the Government of
Alberta, the ALRB, and the Alberta Federation of Labour (AFL). The
second example considers the Saskatchewan government's role in
reshaping its Labour Relations Board in the wake of an election. In
both cases, confusion surrounding the relationship between the
Board and the government resulted in a bitter dispute; and in each,
we believe greater transparency and independence could have
resulted in resolving such disputes or avoiding them altogether.
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A. THE ALBERTA DISPUTE
The first cautionary tale deals with a dispute in Alberta over the role
of the ALRB in the development and implementation of the Labour
Relations (Regional Health Authorities Restructuring) Amendment Act,
20031 (Bill 27) between 2003 and 2006. Bill 27 was the culmination
of efforts to restructure Alberta's health services sector. Through Bill
27, Cabinet was given broad discretion to make regulations on a wide
range of matters dealing with health care restructuring. These include
regulations providing for the establishment and modification of
bargaining unitS2 and the severance and termination pay to
employees of the previous regional health authorities that had
undergone restructuring or a change in governance.3 As a result of
this statute the Lieutenant Governor created the Regional Health
Authority Collective Bargaining Regulation.4
The government presented Bill 27 as a means of streamlining
and enhancing the efficiency of health care collective bargaining.
The legislation had the effect of bringing public health workers into
the realm of essential services. Similar to firefighters, police officers,
and other health care workers, public health workers forfeited the
right to strike while employers were denied the right to lockout
workers in the event of not reaching a collective agreement. 5 Bill 27
amended the Labour Code so that parties from regional health authorities
were required to participate in interest arbitration, as is the case with
other essential service employers and employees. 6 The requirement
for compulsory interest arbitration is set out generally in the Labour
Code,7 and is elaborated in the regulation enacted pursuant to Bill 27
(the Regional Health Authority Collective Bargaining Regulation).8
1 SA 2003, c 6 [Bill 27]. This Bill received Royal Assent on March 27, 2003 and came
into force on April 1, 2003. Associated with Bill 27 was the Regional Health
Authority Collective Bargaining Regulation, AR 80/2003 [Collective Bargaining
Regulation]. The description of dispute surrounding the Bill is based on a report
written by the authors and commissioned by the Alberta Federation of Labour.
The summary of facts of the Alberta dispute relies on the account set out by the
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench in CEP, Local 707 v Alberta (Labour Relations Board),
2004 ABQB 63, 351 AR 267, [CEP] and builds on the research conducted by
Laverne Jacobs on the legislative debates surrounding Bill 27. See Laverne Jacobs,
"Reconciling Independence and Expertise within the Expert, Multifunctional
Tribunals" (Paper delivered at The.Future of Administrative Justice symposium,
University of Toronto, Faculty of Law, 18 January 2008), online:
<http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/conferences/adminjustice08Jacobs.pdf>.
2 Bill 27, supra note 1 (s 5 creating s 162.1 of the Alberta Labour Relations Code RSA
2000, c L-1 [Labour Code]).
3 lbid (creating s 162.2 of the Labour Code).
4 Collective Bargaining Regulation, supra note 1.
5 Labour Code, supra note 2, s 96.
6 Ibid, ss 96-104.
7 Ibid.
8 Collective Bargaining Regulation, supra note 1. See in particular ss 15 and 16.
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The government's policy initiative to eliminate the right to
strike was subject to criticism for the closed process by which it was
developed. Allegations emerged in the House that the legislation was
being "cooked up by a secret cabinet committee" 9 and was the result
of "backroom deals." 10 The concern was whether the government
was making any effort to consult with the unions, employees, and
other affected parties in the development of Bill 27 and its regulations.
The legislation and regulations not only contemplated the
restructuring of the union environment in the health services sector
but also envisioned a new role for the ALRB. Under the Labour Code
the ALRB possessed the general power to determine the units appropriate
for collective bargaining when, because of corporate restructuring,
bargaining units required modification.11 In the particular instance
of restructuring created by Bill 27 and its regulations, the ALRB was
given the additional responsibility of determining the region-wide
functional bargaining units, appropriate bargaining agents, collective
agreements, and other related matters.12
Prior to the introduction of Bill 27 the ALRB had undertaken a
process of consultation on the restructuring of the health services
sector.13 Indeed, the Board had started moving towards standardized
bargaining units in its decision-making as early as the 1970s. 14 Once
the government began restructuring healthcare by dividing service
delivery into regional health authorities in the 1990s, 15 the ALRB, in
response to industry pressure, organized conferences and policy hearings
to re-examine the standard bargaining units it was using at the time. 16
The ALRB produced a discussion paper in 2002 in which it
identified specific recommendations for change and sought responses
in the nature of detailed support or objections from the public.17
9 Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Hansard 25th Leg, 3rd Sess, (5 March 2003) at 299
(Dr Raj Pannu).
10 Ibid at 294 (Dr Ken Nicol). See also, for example, the comment of Dr. Nicol to
Premier Klein during Question Period on March 5, 2003, where he states in
particular: "Changes to our public health care system are now proceeding via
government committees, backroom deals, even shutting out government Members
of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs). Revelations of a secret cabinet committee set
to infringe upon workers' democratic rights is only the latest example of this
government's bungled attempts to manage one of our most precious resources,
our health care professionals." See also Jacobs, supra note 1 at 7.
11 See Labour Code, supra note 2, s 48.
12 See Collective Bargaining Regulation, supra note 1, particularly ss 3-17.
13 See "Standard Health Care Bargaining Units" [2001] Alta LRBR DP-005, online:
<www.alrb.gov.ab.ca/healthcare/dp-005.pdf>.
14 Ibid at 6.
15 CEP, supra note 1 at para 38. The Regional Health Authorities became primary
providers of healthcare services in the province of Alberta effective 1 April 1995.
The Regional Health Authorities Act, RSA 2000, c R-10, mandates this authority.
16 CEP, supra note 1 at paras 40-41.
17 Ibid at para 40.
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Once responses to the recommendations had been reviewed, the ALRB
decided that it would be useful to hold a policy hearing on two key
issues in dispute. It circulated a letter in January 200318 indicating
that it anticipated holding hearings in the fall of 2003 with case
management sessions proceeding in the interim. The Board requested
that stakeholders interested in participating file requests for party or
intervener status by mid-April 2003. However, when the government
introduced Bill 27 in the House on March 11, 2003, the ALRB put its
policy review process on hold for "an indefinite period." 19
The ALRB discontinued its policy review because of a complaint
from several Alberta unions. The unions alleged that there had been
improper contact between the Executive of the Alberta government
and the ALRB in the drafting of Bill 27.20 It was alleged that the Chair
and Vice Chair of the ALRB played a role in developing labour
legislation that overtly favoured employers (including the government
in its role as a public employer). 21 The unions also argued that a
public statement by the Minister of Human Resources and Employment
(HRE) on April 15, 2003 influenced the Chair of the ALRB, through a
speech in the House (with the Chair in the legislative gallery at the
time), to pursue restructuring in the health field expeditiously. 22 As a
result of the political pressure placed on the ALRB, the unions
believed that they were denied natural justice in the course of the
proceedings dealing with Bill 27's imposed restructuring. 23 The
unions also argued that although some members of the tribunal were
not directly involved in the alleged drafting process, all were "tainted"
since they were affected implicitly.24
Specifically, when the legislation was introduced, the unions raised
allegations of bias against the Chair of the ALRB. The key complaints
said to support the allegation of bias relate to memos sent by Chair
Asbell to the Deputy Minister of HRE on February 14, 2003 and
February 24, 2003.25 In addition, the complaints allege interference
by Minister Dunford in comments made in the Legislature on April
15, 2003. Speaking to the government's view that the implementation
18 Ibid at para 41.
19 See "Letter to Stakeholders re: Labour Relations Board Healthcare Bargaining Unit
Policy Review" letter written by Mark Asbell, Chair, Alberta Labour Relations
Board, dated March 11, 2003. See also CEP, supra note 1 at paras 39-41.
20 Ibid at para S.
21 Ibid at para 6.
22 Ibid at paras 6, 43.
23 The Alberta Court of Queen's Bench concluded that many of the procedural errors
that the unions alleged had been made by the ALRB really tied into the same
thesis; namely, that the ALRB was acting unfairly toward them due to pressure by
the government: see ibid at paras 14-17.
24 Ibid at para 2.
25 bid at para 42.
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of Bill 27 should be handled expeditiously, as the Regulation itself
said, Minister Dunford stated:
Moving from that area - and I'll wrap up so others can
speak - I can't resist a comment about Bill 27 and what
we're trying to do there... Bill 27 is simply a bridge to get
from where we are now to where we're going to be, we
believe, by September of 2004. Now, that date is important.
The chairman of the Labour Relations Board is here in the
gallery today, and he needs to hear what the time frame is
that we're placing him under and that this will be one of
the measurements, of course, that we'll be using in terms
of our movement toward the goal. 26
As a result of these disagreements, a motion for judicial review was
brought before the Alberta Queen's Bench by several affected unions.
The applicants sought judicial review on the grounds of breach of
natural justice or, more specifically, reasonable apprehension of bias
due to lack of independence and impartiality.27 At the heart of the
debate was the fact that the HRE had consulted with the ALRB during
its drafting of Bill 27. What is more, neither the Ministry nor the
ALRB had made the consultation public. Knowledge of the consultation
emerged only after the AFL made freedom of information requests to
both the Ministry and the ALRB. 28
The applicant unions and the AFL argued before the Court that
there was improper and undisclosed contact between the Executive
and the Chair of the ALRB with respect to the development of Bill
27.29 The unions requested, first, that all the Board's actions, policies,
and decisions that in any way related to Bill 27 or its regulations be
quashed. 30 The unions further sought an order preventing the ALRB
from taking any future decisions related to that statute.31
Through its freedom of information request, the AFL received
three documents from the HRE prior to the judicial review hearing. 32
26 Ibid at para 43.
27 Ibid at paras 3, 9, 35, 58.
28 Ibid at paras 25-31.
29 Ibid at paras 5-6.
30 Ibid at para 54.
31 Ibid at para 56.
32 Two of these documents-i) a memo from the Chair of the Board to the HRE
Deputy Minister dated February 24, 2003 which apparently responds to the
"Processes" document that seems to have been sent by HRE to the Board and ii) a
memo by the Chair to the HRE Deputy Minister dated February 14, 2003 responding
to a request for numbers of bargaining relationships that would be affected by the
health care proposals-were disclosed by HRE: ibid at paras 25-31. Although the
ALRB possessed these documents and they were responsive to the request made
by the AFL, they claimed exemptions from disclosing them (ibid at paras 31-33).
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Notwithstanding the information disclosed, the Alberta Court of
Queen's Bench rejected the applicant unions' allegations of bias in
relation to the communications at issue. After reviewing the facts
regarding the allegation of bias, the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench
concluded:
In my view, a reasonable outsider would probably have
concluded that the Government and ALRB shared a desire
to move forward with reasonable promptness. I am not
persuaded that this common interest of itself would suggest
a bitter conspiracy to that reasonable person. Different
entities can have common goals without formally agreeing
to them.33
In the fall of 2005, documents surfaced relating to the development
of Bill 27 which had not been before the Court of Queen's Bench.
As a result of various information exchanges, correspondence, and
the response to further freedom of information requests by the AFL,
additional communications between the Executive and the ALRB
were inadvertently disclosed. 34 These documents include email
exchanges between staff of the Legislative Counsel and the Vice Chair
of the ALRB that suggest the Vice Chair was involved in drafting
regulations to Bill 27.
In an exchange of letters dated early December 2005, the Chair of
the ALRB took the position that the Board had taken no steps to
influence the policy decision. 35 The Chair explained that the ALRB
had only a "technical" role in advising the legislature. 36 The AFL
responded that even "'technical' involvement is a breach of the LRB's
role" and damaged the ALRB's ability to act independently.37
The opposition parties called for a public inquiry over the
inappropriate role of the Chair in drafting Bill 27. Although the
government refused to grant this request, the AFL commissioned the
authors to explore the relationship between a labour board and the
government and to make recommendations in light of the situation
33 Ibid at para 48.
34 The Alberta Court of Queen's Bench held that the documents inadvertently
released by the Commissioner were not privileged and that the AFL had disseminated
them before being made aware of the Commissioner's mistake. See Alberta
(Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Federation of Labour, 2005 ABQB
927, 37 Admin LR (4th) 314.
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that had developed with respect to Bill 27.38 Subsequent to the
report, in April of 2007, the ALRB adopted new guidelines that govern
its relationship with government and require disclosure of any advice
or comments provided by the Board on legislative proposals. 39
The judicial decisions on the independence of the ALRB are
discussed further below, but it is worth noting that the Alberta case
demonstrates the perils of too little transparency and accountability
in the relationship between the Board and the government. Given
the problems highlighted in this dispute, is there a legitimate and
appropriate role for a tribunal to provide non-partisan guidance on
how to best modernize legislation? Is there any legitimate role for the
Board in providing this guidance in a secret or confidential fashion?
Some have suggested that it is better to be included in the process in
a non-transparent fashion than to be excluded and have the resulting
legislation be less effective as a result. However, in our view, the
better approach is that guidance from the Board should be open for
parties and stakeholders to see and to challenge that role if they feel
it crosses the line from neutral to a more partisan or substantive role
inappropriate to an independent body which will ultimately have to
impartially adjudicate disputes involving the government of the day.
B. THE SASKATCHEWAN DISPUTE
The second cautionary tale involves Saskatchewan's labour board and
explores the relationship between a new government who believes
that its labour tribunal is at odds with the economic and political
changes that it wishes to pursue.
In 2007, the Saskatchewan provincial election resulted in the
defeat of the long-time New Democratic Party (NDP) government by
the right-of-centre Saskatchewan Party (SP) led by Brad Wall.
Although the party was born out of an alliance between the old
Progressive Conservatives and disgruntled provincial Liberals, the SP
underwent several changes between 2003 and 2007 designed to help
the party appeal to a cross-section of Saskatchewan voters.40
During the election campaign, the SP attempted to promote its
new message of economic competence by promising to "work" with
38 See Lorne Sossin & Charles Smith, The Independent Board and the Legislative Process
(Report Commissioned by the Alberta Federation of Labour), online: Alberta Federation
of Labour <www.afl.org/index.php/View-document/134-2006-June-Independent-
Board-and-the-Legislature-Process.html>.
39 Sarah O'Donnell, "Labour Board Adopts Legislative Rules," Edmonton Journal (3
April 2007) online: <http://www.canada.com/edmontonioumal/news/story.html?id=
baS5fl13-1644-4ddf-b88e-4ddeaaa33219&k=27563>.
40 Raymond Blake, "The Saskatchewan Party and the Politics of Branding," in
Howard Leeson ed, Saskatchewan Politics: Crowding the Centre (Regina: Canadian
Plains Research Centre, 2008) 165.
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employers and trade unions in order to restore a "fair and balanced
labour environment for workers and employers." 41 In its election
platform, the SP promised to eradicate limits on collective bargaining
agreementS42 and to protect public services in the event of a strike. 43
The SP also promised to make changes to the Workers' Compensation
Board (WCB) and, borrowing a proposal from the Saskatchewan
Chamber of Commerce, pledged to advance the cause of "democratic
work places" through mandatory certification elections and enhancing
the ability of employers to speak out during certification drives.44
Alongside its labour relations agenda, the SP mirrored the
programme of numerous neo-liberal governments by promoting a
vision for economic growth tied to lower taxes, more private sector
investment in natural resource extraction, freer inter-provincial trade,
and greater reliance on public-private partnerships. An important
component of this vision was the creation of a new public-private
economic partnership called Enterprise Saskatchewan. 45 This quasi-
corporatist agency was promoted as a way for government, business,
labour, and First Nations (among others) to "measure and report on
Saskatchewan's tax and regulatory environment to ensure that
Saskatchewan's economy remains competitive within the New
West." 46
After his election victory, Wall wasted little time in introducing
and expanding his economic and labour relations agenda. Recalling
the legislature for a brief pre-Christmas sitting, the SP government
promised new "democratic" labour laws designed to be "competitive
with other Canadian jurisdictions."47 In order to make Saskatchewan
competitive in the "New West," the SP modeled its tax and regulatory
reforms on other neo-liberal governments in BC and Alberta. In so
doing, the new government attempted to bridge its conception of
"democratic" and "competitive" labour laws with absolute restrictions
on the ability of workers to organize, collectively bargain, and strike.
41 Saskatchewan Party, Securing the Future: New Ideas for Saskatchewan (2007) at 19,
online: <http://www.poltext.capp.ulaval.ca/upload/SK2007SKp-plt 12072011 95625.pdf>
[Securing the Future].
42 Ibid at 19.
43 Ibid at 20.
44 Bruce Johnstone, "Chamber wants change; Business lobby pushes labour laws as
election issue," The [Saskatoon] Star-Phoenix (23 October 2007) A8.
45 David McGrane, "The 2007 Provincial Election in Saskatchewan," (2008) 2:1
Canadian Political Science Review 64 at 66.
46 Securing the Future, supra note 41 at 19.
47 Saskatchewan, Legislative Assembly, LegislativeAssernbly Speech from the Throne 2007,
26th Leg, 1st Sess, (10 December 2007) at 5, online: Government of Saskatchewan
<http://www.gov.sk.ca/adx/aspx/adxGetMedia.aspx?DoclD=1619,617,534,206.
Documents&MedialD=2071 &Filename=2007+Throne+Speech.pdf&l=English>.
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The SP linked its version of economic competitiveness and
democratic labour laws to the introduction of Bill 5, The Public Service
Essential Services Act (PSESA) and Bill 6, An Act to amend the Trade
Union Act (TUA) in late December of 2007.48 The only groups that
appear to have been consulted on the new bills were government-
aligned lawyers and members of the business sector.49
The PSESA incorporated a sweeping definition of the term
"essential services." Under the new definition, all workers employed
by the government of Saskatchewan; provincial crown corporations;
regional health authorities; colleges and universities; municipalities;
and any "person, agency or body, or class of persons, agencies or
bodies, that provides an essential service to the public," are deemed
essential. 50 Within ninety days of a collective agreement expiring,
the public employer and the trade union involved must begin
negotiations to conclude an "essential services agreement." 5' The
agreement is required to contain a detailed list of what services,
workers, and worker classifications must be maintained in the event
of a work stoppage. 52 If the employer and the trade union cannot
agree on the essential service designation, section 9 of the Act
gives the employer unilateral power to impose an essential service
designation. 53
Bill 6, the amendment to the TUA, made several changes to the
rules surrounding certification and unfair labour practices. 54 The new
bill changed the threshold for unions to achieve certification. Under
the old rules, a union could ask the SLRB to order a certification vote
if it demonstrated through signed cards (card-check certification)
that it had twenty-five per cent support in a workplace. If a union
demonstrated fifty per cent support, the SLRB could automatically
certify the new bargaining unit. The new bill made votes mandatory
48 Bill 5, An Act respecting Essential Public Services, 1st Sess, 26th Leg, Saskatchewan,
2007 c P-42.2 (assented to 14 May 2008), [Bill 5]; Bill 6, An Act to amend the Trade
Union Act, 1st Sess, 26th Leg, Saskatchewan, 2007, (assented to 14 May 2008) [Bill
6].
49 James Wood, "Calvert questions role of lawyer in crafting Sask. Party labour laws;
Private sector lawyer only advising gov't," The [Saskatoon] StarPhoenix (18 March
2008) A7.
50 Bill 5, supra note 48, s 21. This gives cabinet the power to define, enlarge or restrict
the services deemed essential. Currently, workers in corrections, energy, environment,
government services, social services, information technology, highways, health
and numerous other sectors fall under the purview of the Act. See The Public
Service Essential Services Regulations, RRS 2009, c P-42.2.
51 Bill 5, supra note 48, s 6(1)(a).
52 Ibid, s 7(1)(b).
53 Ibid, s 9.
54 The legislation also made several changes to the SLRB, transferring some of its
responsibility to cabinet and requiring new time limits for the Board to rule on
unfair labour practice cases: Bill 6, supra note 48.
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in all cases and changed the threshold to obtain a vote to forty-five
per cent.55 The mandatory voting procedure and the watering down
of the card-check certification process placed significant obstacles in
front of any union seeking certification. 56
The amendments also altered the provisions in the Act dealing
with unfair labour practices. The changes extended the freedom of
employers to "speak" during ongoing certification drives. Traditionally,
limits on management speech recognize that employers retain
extraordinary power in the workplace and are thus able to influence
the outcome of a certification drive. Recognizing this, most legislation
forbids employers from doing anything to "interfere with, restrain,
intimidate, threaten, or coerce an employee in the exercise of any
right conferred by this Act."5 7 The SP's amendments maintain this
language but include new sections, stating that "nothing in this Act
precludes an employer from communicating facts, and its opinions to
its employees." 58 The extension of employer speech provisions alters
the ability of unions to freely communicate with workers during a
certification drive and, ultimately, will make union organizing more
prone to potential employer abuse.
Both pieces of legislation give the SLRB a great deal of discretion
to mitigate the inevitable tension arising out of the new labour
legislation. The only institution capable of administering these new
rules while maintaining any semblance of neutrality in the collective
bargaining process is an independent board. Given these circumstances,
it would have seemed prudent for the government to maintain or
even strengthen the neutrality of the Board to administer its new
labour legislation; yet, the government took the opposite approach.
On March 7, 2008, the SP Government passed an Order-in-Council
55 Ibid, s 3(1)-(2).
56 On the negative influence of mandatory voting procedures see Sara Slinn, "The
Effect of Compulsory Certification Votes on Certification Applications in Ontario:
An Empirical Analysis," (2003) 10 CLELJ 367 at 386-88. Slinn found that changes
to mandatory voting in Ontario resulted in a 21.28 per cent drop in successful
union certification applications. See also Chris Riddell, "Union Certification
Success Under Voting Versus Card-Check Procedures: Evidence from British Columbia,
1978-1998," (2003-2004) 57 Indus & Lab Rel Rev 493; Felice Martinello, "Correlates
of Certification Application Success in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and
Manitoba" (1996) 51:3 Relations Industrielles 544. For an analysis that examines
labour law changes within a political, economic and social context, see Charlotte
AB Yates, "Staying the Decline in Union Membership: Union Organizing in
Ontario, 1985-1999" (2000) 55:4 Relations Industrielles 640. See also Andrew
Jackson, "Rowing Against the Tide: The Struggle to Raise Union Density in a
Hostile Environment" in Pradeep Kumar & Christopher Robert Schenk, eds, Paths
to Union Renewal: Canadian Experiences (Toronto: Broadview Press, 2006) 61.
57 Bill 6, supra note 48, s 6.
58 Ibid.
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terminating the appointments of SLRB Chair James Seibel and Vice-
Chairs Angela Zborosky and Catherine Zuck. 59 All three members
were fired before the end of their scheduled terms (some in mid-
hearing) and the government gave no reasons for the dismissals. The
government also dismissed John Solomon as chair of the WCB. The
SP government stated only that these types of changes were "routine,"
denying that there was a political agenda behind the terminations. 60
Following the firings, the government announced the appointment
of Kenneth Love as chair of the SLRB and David Eberle as chair of the
WCB. Both men were acknowledged SP supporters and had held
positions with the party in the past.61 Love was also a well-known
management lawyer with little history presenting before the Board or
representing labour unions. At the same time, the government
announced that the SLRB chair's salary would be raised from
$120,000 to $180,000 per year, adding to the perception that the
appointment was as much a political reward as a prudent administrative
decision. Later, the Government announced that Steven Schiefner, a
city lawyer from Moose Jaw, would take over as vice-chair of the
Board. 62
The Government's heavy-handed changes to the SLRB were met
with vigorous opposition from the province's trade unions. The
Saskatchewan Federation of Labour (SFL), combined with several
affiliates, vowed to oppose the changes to the SLRB through political
and legal means. In late 2008, the SFL, the Saskatchewan Joint Board
Retail Wholesale and Department Store Union, and the Canadian
Union of Public Employees applied to the Court of Queen's Bench for
judicial review. 63 The unions asked the court to interpret whether the
cabinet had the authority to unilaterally dismiss quasi-independent
members of administrative tribunals. The unions maintained that the
terminations violated the principles of judicial independence and the
overall purpose of the TUA. Upon review, the Court ruled that the
government had the authority under The Interpretation Act 64 to make
the changes. 65 The Court also ruled that cabinet could terminate
59 Labour Relations Board Membership Changes, Sask OC 98/2008, online: Government
of Saskatchewan <http://www.publications.gov.sk.ca/details.cfm?p=25969>.
60 James Wood, "Firings at labour board," The [Regina] Leader-Post (7 March 2008) A2.
61 Jennifer Graham, "Unions upset, but Saskatchewan minister defends firing of
labour board officials," The Canadian Press (7 March 2008).
62 "Gov't appoints LRB vice-chair," The [Saskatoon] Star Phoenix (12 July 2008) A9. The
SP defended the salary increases by only replacing one of the two vice-chairs (ibid).
63 Saskatchewan Federation of Labour et al v The Government of Saskatchewan (The
Department of Advanced Education, Employment and Labour) Saskatchewan Labour
Relations Board, 2009 SKQB 20, 305 DLR (4th) 280 [Saskatchewan Federation of
Labour, QB].
64 The Interpretation Act, 1995, RSS c 1-11.2.
65 Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, QB, supra note 63 at para 37.
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appointments to the SLRB because appointments were always "at
pleasure." 66
On appeal, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal upheld the lower
court's decision that the cabinet maintains the legal ability to replace
members of administrative tribunals. 67 The Court of Appeal disagreed,
however, that members of the SLRB simply sit "at pleasure." 68 As the
SLRB is an arm's length institution that operates on the principles of
natural justice, there is a reasonable degree of independence and
therefore a measure of security of tenure. 69 Notwithstanding this
small remonstration, the court maintained that the SP's actions were
legal under s. 20 of The Interpretation Act.70
Nevertheless, the SP's decision to remove members of the Board
called into question, at least for members of the SFL, the independence
and bias of the Board under the SP Government. According to
numerous statements from union leadership, the perception is that
the Board is now intimately tied to the SP's anti-union agenda.71 As
commentary from union members suggests, the SP's unilateral decision
to fire the previous members of the labour board is central to this
interpretation.
What lesson can be taken from the Saskatchewan experience? Once
again, we believe that the lack of a clear and transparent process for
selecting or removing board members in order to further a particular
policy goal has fuelled the dispute. In light of this confusion, aggrieved
parties in Saskatchewan have turned, as in the Alberta case, to the
courts. Given the wide discretion afforded the executive on the
appointment of decision-makers to administrative tribunals and agencies,
on what basis will a court conclude that a government's intervention
in the membership of the tribunal is a breach of independence? In
the following section, we explore the legal context within which
tribunals and government interact.
66 Ibid at paras 50-51.
67 Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v The Government of Saskatchewan (The
Department of Advanced Education, Employment and Labour) Saskatchewan Labour
Relations Board, 2010 SKCA 27, 317 DLR (4th) 127 at paras 51-60.
68 lbid at para 33.
69 Ibid at para 45.
70 Ibid at paras 51-60.
71 Wood, supra note 60 at Al. As SFL president Larry Hubich stated, "the Sask. Party
has long had it in for the Labour Relations Board, which hears disputes between
unions and employers around labour legislation, because it contended it was too
friendly to labour. That is just false and it's based on sore losers within the business
community who go to the Labour Relations Board and are found to be violating
the law. Now the government has brought in a couple of pieces of legislation to
make legal what was previously illegal and gut The Trade Union Act and that's not
enough for them" (ibid).
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III. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF ADJUDICATIVE BOARDS IN
THE POLICY PROCESS?
Given the tension that can arise between a government's legitimate
political agenda and maintaining administrative independence, it is
necessary to examine how boards operate within the policy process.
This section will address the following questions: What is the role of
an adjudicative board in relation to the political process, including
the development of policy which the board will subsequently have
to interpret; and what ought to be the requirements, if any, of
transparency with respect to such a role for a board in other
jurisdictions? To what extent can government use appointments
and removals from adjudicative boards as a tool for furthering
policy goals? In order to address these questions, it is first necessary
to set out the framework for how independence is understood in the
context of administrative law.
A. INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY IN CANADIAN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
It should be stated at the outset that the "right" of institutional
independence is not a right enjoyed by a tribunal; rather, it is a right
enjoyed by those whose disputes are adjudicated by that tribunal.72
Tribunals constitute a part of the executive branch of government.
Much of the particularity and peculiarity of institutional independence
in Canadian administrative law, however, arises because the institutional
independence protection at common law has been modeled on the
constitutional norm of judicial independence.
The standard of bias used in administrative law does not require
those who allege it to show actual bias on the part of a decision-
maker. Rather, the applicants in these cases must establish that the
facts and circumstances give rise to a perception of bias. The perception
test is referred to as a reasonable apprehension of bias. De Grandpr6 J.
sets out the test with great clarity in his dissenting reasons in
Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board:7 3
[T]he apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one,
held by reasonable and right-minded persons, applying
themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the
required information.... [The] test is "what would an informed
72 Once again, in this sense, the analogy to judicial independence holds. See Mackin
v New Brunswick (Minister of Finance), 2002 SCC 13, [2002] 1 SCR 405, Binnie J,
dissenting.
73 [1978] 1 SCR 369, 68 DLR (3d) 716 [cited to SCRI.
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person, viewing the matter realistically and practically -
and having thought the matter through - conclude."7 4
In Valente v. The Queen,75 the Supreme Court of Canada noted that,
broadly speaking, the test for independence in the judicial setting
is "the one for reasonable apprehension of bias, adapted to the
requirement of independence." 76 The Court further noted that,
although there is obviously a close relationship between independence
and impartiality, they are nevertheless separate and distinct values or
requirements:
The word "impartial" ... connotes absence of bias, actual or
perceived. The word "independent" in s. 11(d) reflects or
embodies the traditional constitutional value of judicial
independence. As such, it connotes not merely a state of
mind or attitude in the actual exercise of judicial functions,
but a status or relationship to others, particularly to the Executive
Branch of government, that rests on objective conditions or
guarantees.77
While administrative tribunals are viewed as part of the executive
branch in a separation of powers context,78 the Court has adopted
the framework of institutional independence for administrative
bodies directly from this judicial framework. 79 According to that
framework, there are three essential conditions of judicial independence:
security of tenure, financial security, and administrative independence.
The category of institutional independence is most relevant in this
context. In Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band,80 the Supreme
Court of Canada held that the test for institutional independence
74 Ibid at 394.
75 [1985] 2 SCR 673, 24 DLR (4th) 161 [Valente cited to SCR].
76 Ibid at 684.
77 Ibid at 685 [emphasis added].
78 As Katrina Wyman put it, "The doctrine of tribunal independence is not concerned
with establishing administrative tribunals as a fourth branch of government":
Katrina Miriam Wyman, "The Independence of Administrative Tribunals in an Era
of Ever Expanding Judicial Independence" (2000) 14 CJALP 61 at 100. See also
Donald JM Brown & JM Evans, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada,
loose-leaf, (Toronto: Canvasback Publishing, 1998, Ch 11 at 4120), who note that
where an executive body appears before an executive tribunal, a conflict does not
inherently arise.
79 In earlier cases, such as International Woodworkers of America, Local 2-69 v
Consolidated-Bathurst Packaging, [1990] 1 SCR 282, 68 DLR (4th) 524 [Consolidated-
Bathurst Packaging], the term "judicial independence" was used by this Court to
characterize the common law standards applicable to a labour tribunal.
80 [1995] 1 SCR 3, 122 DLR (4th) 129 [Matsquij.
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enunciated in Valente applied, with added flexibility, to administrative
tribunals.81 Lamer C.J. stated:
I begin my analysis of the institutional independence issue
by observing that the ruling of this court in Valente, supra,
provides guidance in assessing the independence of an
administrative tribunal.
This court has considered Valente, supra, in at least one
case involving an administrative tribunal, Consolidated-
Bathurst Packaging Ltd. v. International Woodworkers of
America, Local 2-69..., in which the independence of the
Ontario Labour Relations Board was at issue. There,
Gonthier J. stated at p. 332:
Judicial independence is a long standing principle of
our constitutional law which is also part of the rules of
natural justice even in the absence of constitutional
protection.
I agree and conclude that it is a principle of natural justice
that a party should receive a hearing before a tribunal which
is not only independent, but also appears independent.
Where a party has a reasonable apprehension of bias, it
should not be required to submit to the tribunal giving rise
to this apprehension. Moreover, the principles for judicial
independence outlined in Valente are applicable in the
case of an administrative tribunal, where the tribunal is
functioning as an adjudicative body settling disputes and
determining the rights of parties. However, I recognize
that a strict application of these principles is not always
warranted.8 2
Lamer C.J. concluded that the Valente principles apply to administrative
tribunals on the basis of natural justice, but that the test for
institutional independence may be less strict than for courts.83
The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that where a tribunal
has more than one function (for example, making policy, prosecuting
regulatory offences and adjudication), this commingling of functions
81 While Sopinka J. appeared to write for the greatest number of judges on this point,
it is Lamer C.J.'s decision that has become the predominant articulation of
institutional independence in Canada.
82 Matsqui, supra note 80 at paras 75, 79, 80, citing Valente, supra note 75, and quoting
Consolidated-Bathurst Packaging Ltd v International Woodworkers of America [1990] 1
SCR 282, 68 DLR (4th) 524.
83 Ibid at paras 83-85.
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without internal safeguards can lead to a reasonable apprehension of
bias. This issue was addressed in 2747-3174 Qubbec Inc. v. Quebec (Rgie
des permis d'alcool).84 In Rfgie, the Court clarified and refined the
suggestion in Matsqui that administrative tribunals are subject to the
Valente principles of institutional independence but the requisite
level of institutional independence may be lower than for a court,
and concluded that the directors (adjudicators) of the R~gie had
sufficient security of tenure because they could not be simply
removed at pleasure (that is, without cause).
Thus, in Rfgie, the focus of the Court was on objective guarantees
and the perceptions of an independent branch of government, not
the realities of political interference with the activities of an adjudicative
tribunal.
This focus shifted somewhat in Hewat v. Ontario,85 where the Ontario
Court of Appeal considered the issue of institutional independence in
the context of a labour board.86 The appellants were vice chairs of the
Ontario Labour Relations Board who had been appointed by Order-
in-Council for a fixed term of three years. For reasons which were
widely understood to be political incompatibility, the Ontario
government revoked their appointments mid-term by way of an
Order-in-Council, and the vice chairs challenged the validity of these
orders. The Ontario Divisional Court found the orders revoking the
appointments were invalid but declined to order that the vice chairs
be reinstated, awarding damages instead. The vice chairs appealed,
arguing that, if they were not reinstated to their positions, "then the
government is putting tribunal officers in the same position as
employees generally-they can be dismissed at will so long as the
employer is prepared to pay damages."87 The Ontario Court of Appeal
noted the impracticality of ordering reinstatement as a remedy given
the length of time that had passed since the revocations had
occurred. However, the Court acknowledged the validity of the vice
chairs' arguments regarding the institutional independence of the
Board if the government were able to revoke appointments at will, on
payment of compensation:
I do not see the issues before this court as bringing into
play constitutional safeguards against the conduct of
government. Indeed, it would be intellectually naive not
84 [1996] 3 SCR 919, 140 DLR (4th) 577 [Rigie].
85 (1998), 156 DLR (4th) 193, 7 Admin LR (3d) 257 [Hewat cited to DLRJ.
86 For discussion of the significance of this case, see Katrina Wyman, "Appointments
to Adjudicative Tribunals: Politics and Courts" (1999) 57(2) U of T Fac L Rev 101.
See also C Flood, "Hewat v Ontano" (1998) CLELJ 263.
87 Hewat, supra note 85 at para 12.
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to recoghize that elected governments must have room to
make political decisions and to conduct themselves in a
manner to assure that their political policies are implemented...
There are many tribunals, agencies and boards in this
province, each with different responsibilities, and it would
be difficult to lay down any single rule or practice that
would be suitable for all. That having been said, the
Ontario Labour Relations Board in its quasi-judicial functions
must of necessity maintain a public perception of independence
from government if the public is to have any respect for its
decisions. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how any tribunal
with quasi-judicial functions could maintain the appearance of
integrity to those who appear before it, without some degree of
independence.88
The link between appointments and independence was raised
squarely in Canadian Union of Public Employees v. Ontario (the Retired
Judges case). 89 This case concerned the discretion of Ministers of
Labour in Ontario to appoint chairs to interest arbitration panels in
the hospital sector pursuant to the Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration
Act.90 Chairs of interest arbitrations were previously chosen from a
group composed largely of experienced and mutually acceptable
individuals. The Minister changed the process such that retired
judges were appointed. The central issue in the appeal was whether
this change breached the duty of fairness by interfering with the
impartiality and independence of the arbitrators and raising a reasonable
apprehension of bias, or by interfering with the legitimate expectations
of the applicant union. The Divisional Court dismissed the application.
The Court of Appeal reversed this finding and found that the
change in appointment schemes violated the institutional independence
of the arbitration boards and also constituted a breach of the legitimate
expectations of the applicant. 9 1 With respect to the breach of
independence finding Austin J.A., writing for the Court, held that
retired judges who were appointed effectively at pleasure and on an
88 Ibid at para 21 [emphasis added; emphasis omitted].
89 (2000), 194 DLR (4th) 265, 51 OR (3d) 417 (CA), aff'd 2003 SCC 29, [2003] 1 SCR
539 [Retired Judges].
90 RSO 1990, c H.14 [HLDAA]. Section 6(5) provides:
Where the two members appointed by or on behalf of the parties fail
within ten days after the appointment of the second of them to agree
upon the third member, notice of such failure shall be given forthwith
to the Minister by the parties, the two members or either of them and
the Minister shall appoint as a third member a person who is, in the.
opinion of the Minister, qualified to act.
91 Retired Judges, supra note 89 at paras 99-102.
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ad hoc basis lacked financial security and security of tenure. 92 He also
found that the Minister (and the Government generally) had a
financial stake in the outcome of the labour arbitrations93 and thus
it created a perception of bias for the Minister alone to be responsible
for appointments of chairs for the arbitration panels. 94 The Court's
holding suggested that while the Minister had discretion to appoint
anyone who in his opinion was qualified, this discretion was in fact
limited to those qualified people who would be perceived as independent.
This would represent a significant check on the Minister's appointment
power (and could effectively limit his options to the roster of mutually
agreed upon arbitrators which had dominated appointments prior to
the Minister's change).
The limits of tribunal independence in the face of the clear policy
direction of the Government were the subject of the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (General
Manager, Liquor Control and Licensing Branch).95 In Ocean Port the
Court confirmed that the guarantee of institutional independence in
adjudicative tribunal settings is not a constitutional right, but rather
a common law protection, and as such, is vulnerable to the government
overriding it through ordinary statutory language at any time for any
reason.96
The dispute in Ocean Port involved a challenge to the independence
of the Liquor Appeal Board on the basis that its members could be
appointed at pleasure without security of tenure. However, the
Supreme Court of Canada pointed out that, even if the tribunal did
not meet the common law natural justice requirements for institutional
independence, this was not fatal to its ability to function:
It is well-established that, absent constitutional constraints,
the degree of independence required of a particular
government decision maker or tribunal is determined by
its enabling statute. It is the legislature or Parliament that
determines the degree of independence required of tribunal
members. The statute must be construed as a whole to
determine the degree of independence the legislature
intended. 97
92 Ibid at para 98.
93 Ibid at para 21.
94 Ibid at para 99.
95 2001 SCC 52, [2001] 2 SCR 781 [Ocean Port].
96 For a more detailed appraisal of Ocean Port, see P Bryden, "Structural
Independence of Administrative Tribunals in the Wake of Ocean Port" (2003) 16
CJALP 125.
97 Ocean Port, supra note 95 at para 20.
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The Court went on to assert that:
Confronted with silent or ambiguous legislation, courts
generally infer that Parliament or the legislature intended
the tribunal's process to comport with principles of natural
justice.. .In such circumstances, administrative tribunals
may be bound by the requirement of an independent and
impartial decision maker, one of the fundamental principles
of natural justice: Matsqui, supra (per Lamer C.J. and Sopinka
J.); Rfgie, supra, at para. 39; Katz v. Vancouver Stock Exchange....
Indeed, courts will not lightly assume that legislators
intended to enact procedures that run contrary to this
principle, although the precise standard of independence
required will depend "on all the circumstances, and in
particular on the language of the statute under which the
agency acts, the nature of the task it performs and the type
of decision it is required to make": Rdgie [supral, at para. 39.
However, like all principles of natural justice, the degree of
independence required of tribunal members may be ousted by
express statutory language or necessary implication. ... Ultimately,
it is Parliament or the legislature that determines the nature of
a tribunal's relationship to the executive. It is not open to a court
to apply a common law rule in the face of clear statutory
direction. Courts engaged in judicial review of administrative
decisions must defer to the legislator's intention in assessing the
degree of independence required of the tribunal in question.98
The Court clarified the scope and implication of Ocean Port in Bell v.
Canadian Telephone Employees Association,99 particularly in the
context of purely adjudicative administrative settings. (Bell concerned
a challenge to the independence and impartiality of the Canadian
Human Rights Tribunal on the basis of the influence over the
Tribunal exercised by the Canadian Human Rights Commission, a
party to proceedings before the Tribunal).100
The Supreme Court used its decision in Bell to reiterate two
principles of administrative independence. First, the Court affirmed
its position in Ocean Port that adjudicative tribunals do not enjoy any
constitutionally rooted protection of judicial independence or
98 Ibid at para 21-22 [emphasis added].
99 2003 SCC 36, [2003] 1 SCR 884 [Bell].
100 Ibid and see Bell Canada v Canadian Telephone Employees Assn, [1998] 3 FC 244
(TD), 143 FTR 241.
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impartiality. Writing jointly for the Court, McLachlin C.J. and
Bastarache J. also rejected the attempt by Bell to delineate a category
of tribunals known as "quasi-judicial" or "purely adjudicative,"
which would be subject to higher requirements of independence and
impartiality. They make clear that the determination of the particular
standard of independence and impartiality required in a particular
setting must involve a contextual rather than a categorical analysis:
To say that tribunals span the divide between the executive
and the judicial branches of government is not to imply
that there are only two types of tribunals - those that are
quasi-judicial and require the full panoply of procedural
protections, and those that are quasi-executive and require
much less. A tribunal may have a number of different
functions, one of which is to conduct fair and impartial
hearings in a manner similar to that of the courts, and yet
another of which is to see that certain government policies
are furthered. In ascertaining the content of the requirements
of procedural fairness that bind a particular tribunal,
consideration must be given to all of the functions of that
tribunal... All aspects of the tribunal's structure, as laid out
in its enabling statute, must be examined, and an attempt
must be made to determine precisely what combination of
functions the legislature intended that tribunal to serve,
and what procedural protections are appropriate for a body
that has these particular functions.101
In Ocean Port, McLachlin C.J. characterized tribunals as spanning "the
constitutional divide between the judiciary and the executive." 102
This metaphor suggests a set of institutions which, functionally at
least, operate within both the judicial and executive spheres. While
conceding that courts and tribunals may share similar functions,
McLachlin CJ. stressed that it is the constitutional status of each that
was at issue in this case. Of tribunals, she stated, "While they may
possess adjudicative functions, they ultimately operate as part of
the executive branch of government, under the mandate of the
legislature."1 0 3 While lower court judges have explored other
grounds on which the independence of tribunals may be protected,
notably in the context of the rule of law arguments underpinning the
B.C. Supreme Court in McKenzie v. Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor
101 Bell, supra note 99 at para 22 [emphasis in original].
102 Ocean Port, supra note 95 at para 32.
103 lbid.
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General,104 these have yet to find broad acceptance in appellate
settings.
A higher-profile instance of the Court declining to interfere with
government action occurred with respect to Linda Keen, who was
removed as President of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
(CNSC). 105 Natural Resources Minister Gary Lunn, who removed
Keen in January of 2008, justified Keen's removal on the basis that
she had lost the government's confidence over the way she handled
the shutdown of the medical isotope-producing nuclear reactor in
Chalk River, Ontario, owned and operated by Atomic Energy of
Canada Limited, a Crown corporation, in December 2007.106
Keen was removed as President of the CNSC on January 15, 2008,
the day before she was scheduled to appear before the House of
Commons' Natural Resources Committee to offer her version of the
events leading up to the shutdown of the reactor. Critics were quick
to condemn the Minister's decision as a political maneuver aimed at
silencing a federal employee's criticism of a controversial
Government decision. For example, "Liberal [Member of Parliament]
David McGuinty accused the Conservatives of U.S. Republican-style
tactics by dismissing Keen in the 'dark of night,' just hours before she
was due to testify." 107
In a December 27 letter from Lunn to Keen (leaked to the Ottawa
Citizen), the Minister indicated that he questioned Keen's judgment
in the Chalk River/medical isotopes incident and was considering
having her removed. 108 Keen responded by accusing the Minister of
improper interference and threatened litigation if she were
removed. 109
While Keen remained a CNSC commissioner following her
termination as President of the CNSC (she subsequently resigned in
104 2006 BCSC 1372, 272 DLR (4th) 455 [McKenzie]. For greater discussion of McKenzie
and its implications for the independence of tribunals, see Ron Ellis, "The Future of
Administrative Justice: Current Issues in Tribunal Independence" (2008), online:
<http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/conferences/adminjustice08-Ellis.pdf>.
105 For further discussion of Keen's case and its implications, see L Sossin, "The Puzzle
of Independence for Administrative Bodies" (2008) 26 NJCL 1; L Sossin,
"Administrative Law at Pleasure: Keen Ruling" (2009) 10 Regulatory Boards and
Administrative Law Litigation 628.
106 CBC News, "Nuclear Safety Watchdog Head Fired for 'Lack of Leadership': Minister"
(16 January 2008), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/01/16/keen-
firing.html> [CBC News].
107 Ibid.
108 See David Ljunggren, "Canada Government Set to Fire Nuclear Watchdog," The
Ottawa Citizen (8 January 2008), online: Reuters Canada <http://ca.reuters.com/
article/topNews/idCAN0830875520080108>.
109 CBC News, supra note 106.
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September of 2008), she challenged the Government's action in
Federal Court. In April 2009, the Federal Court dismissed her claim,
based largely on the Ocean Port argument that the position of
President of the CNSC is an "at pleasure" appointment. 110
It is worth emphasizing that the leading case law from the
Supreme Court of Canada, discussed above, explores the requirement
of independence for tribunals either in terms of statutory language
(for example, was the appointment "at pleasure"?) or in terms of the
objective and structural features of a tribunal (for example, security of
tenure) which determine whether it is sufficiently independent at
common law. There is far less guidance when it comes to improper
communications between tribunals and government and the concept
of institutional or corporate "taint" (the idea that if certain members
of the Board are exposed to a particular view, it may be inferred that
the entire tribunal has been so exposed). 111
While the Supreme Court's jurisprudence has attempted to constrain
the development of tribunal independence as a constitutional
principle, it has at the same time recognized the importance of
such independence as an organizing principle of administrative
justice. The Court's approach to the issue of independence may be
described as ambivalent. 112 Indeed, the Supreme Court has used the
constitutional doctrine of judicial independence as the point of
departure for developing the common law doctrine of administrative
independence.11 3 While the Court makes clear that a legislature
may authorize "at pleasure" appointments, the broader constitutional
foundation of the principle of impartiality, in which the independence
doctrine is situated, remains to be fully explored by the Court. Having
affirmed for the past fifty years, since Roncarelli v. Duplessis,114 that no
legislature can be interpreted as authorizing arbitrary exercises of
executive discretion, it would be difficult to imagine a court upholding
110 See Keen v Canada (Attorney General) 2009 FC 353, [2009] FCJ No 402.
111 This idea of "corporate taint" was discussed in EA Manning Ltd v Ontario (Securities
Commission) (1995), 125 DLR (4th) 305, 23 OR (3d) 257, leave to appeal to SCC
refused, 125 DLR (4th) vii, in which the Ontario Court of Appeal concluded,
"Although there may be circumstances where the conduct of a tribunal, or its
members, could constitute institutional bias and preclude a tribunal from proceeding
further, this is not such a case. This is not a case where the Commission has
already passed judgment upon the very matters which are to be considered in the
pending hearings" (at 317).
112 For discussion of this apparent ambivalence toward the doctrine of administrative
independence, see Lorne Sossin, "The Ambivalence of Administrative Justice in
Canada: Does Canada Need a Fourth Branch?" in Lamer: The Sacred Fire, eds Daniel
Jutras and Adam Dodek (2009) 46 Sup Ct L R 51.
113 See, for example, Matsqui, supra note 80; Consolidated-Bathurst Packaging, supra
note 79.
114 [1959] SCR 121, 16 DLR (2d) 689.
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a legislative provision which purported to authorize biased decision-
making by an executive body. If a lack of impartiality cannot be
legitimately authorized by a legislature, how is it possible to legislate
a scheme which expressly lacks independence?
This relationship between the common law doctrine of independence
and its constitutional origins is particularly important in the context
of appointments to and removals from administrative tribunals where
the legitimacy of administrative justice in the eyes of the public is at
stake. It is a widely shared view that public confidence in the
administrative justice system would be enhanced by a merit-based
system of appointments, but it not always clear how this commitment
could be most effectively enshrined in law,115 particularly in light of
the fact that the judges who would issue such a ruling are themselves
appointed without such constraints on executive discretion.
While the Supreme Court has recognized that administrative
appointments must be a "reasonable" exercise of discretion in Retired
Judges,116 the Court has not recognized expressly that the appointment
process can undermine the independence of the tribunal,117 or that
political patronage is inconsistent per se with the independence of an
adjudicative tribunal. When the Canadian Bar Association Task Force
on administrative appointments asked the federal government for a
description of the appointment process, it was told that no such
description existed and that each order-in-council appointment was
a separate matter to be considered on its own merits. 118 The Task
Force concluded, "This appears to be an arbitrary way to conduct
public business." 119
115 For discussion, see Peter Aucoin & Elizabeth Goodyear-Grant, "Designing a Merit-
Based Process for Appointing Boards of ABCs: Lessons from the Nova Scotia
Reform Experience" (2002) 45 Can Public Admin 301.
116 Supra note 89.
117 For further discussion of the relevant case law, see Lorne Sossin, "The Uneasy
Relationship between Independence and Appointments in Canadian Administrative
Law" in Grant Huscroft & Michael Taggart, eds, Inside and Outside Canadian
Administrative Law: Essays in Honour of David Mullan (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2006) 50.
118 Ed Ratushny, Report of the Canadian Bar Association Task Force on the Independence
of Federal Administrative Tribunals and Agencies in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Bar
Association, 1990) at 135-56.
119 Ibid. See also Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report on Independent
Administrative Agencies: A Framework for Decision-Making (Ottawa: The
Commission, 1985); Murray Rankin, "The Cabinet and the Agencies: Toward
Accountability in British Columbia" (1985), 19 UBC L Rev 25; HN Janisch,
"Independence of Administrative Tribunals: In Praise of 'Structural Heretics"'
(1988), 1 CJALP 1; Sheldon Scott, "The Continuing Debate Over the
Independence of Regulatory Tribunals" in Special Lectures of the Law Society of
Upper Canada 1992, Administrative Law, Principles, Practice and Pluralism (Toronto:
Carswell, 1993) 79.
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Thus, the legal backdrop provides a framework for approaching
questions of administrative independence, but little specific guidance
as to the appropriate relationship between adjudicative tribunals and
the government of the day. It is against this backdrop that the Alberta
and Saskatchewan cases should be understood. Watson J. of the
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench heard the legal challenge by the
unions to the ALRB's involvement in the drafting of Bill 27 in January
of 2004, discussed above. The unions argued that not only were the
independence and impartiality of the Chair and Vice Chair compromised
by their involvement in the legislative process, but that this "taint"
spread to all members of the Board.
The ALRB itself declined to rule on the allegations that it had
breached the requirements of independence and impartiality. The
panel presiding over the matter in which this challenge was raised
offered the following explanation for declining to rule:
There is an inevitable tension in this and any other
statutory labour relations board between its role as a
government-created entity charged with ongoing
responsibility for administration of collective labour
relations laws and policy-in effect, a participant in both
government and the labour relations system that government
regulates-and its role as a neutral adjudicator of parties'
rights within that system. In possessing these dual roles,
the Board is not a court, for all the court-like qualities and
obligations it possesses. The Applicants' demand for a
hearing has every prospect of bringing those roles into
direct conflict with each other, to the detriment of one or
the other. In dealing with all these and other, unforeseen,
issues that a hearing might generate, the Board would be
asked by the parties to prefer one role over the other. Every
decision along the way to the ultimate resolution of the
applications would be attended by the risk that parties so
minded would fear of two things: either that the Board was
protecting its interest as a branch of government; or that
the Board, cowed by arguments that called its commitment
to the principles of natural justice into question, was giving
insufficient weight to contrary considerations.
This is, in our opinion, a result to be avoided. We consider
that the long-term health of the labour relations system
and the long-term reputation of the Board could only
suffer by the spectacle of the Board so patently sitting in
judgment of its own independence when the attack is
based on factual considerations rather than exclusively
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considerations of practice, procedure or institutional
structure. We simply decline to be the forum within which
these particular allegations are dealt with.120
In CEP, Watson J. held that the Board had not erred by deferring
decision on this question to the Court and that, in light of the facts
and circumstances, the ALRB Chair's involvement in the drafting of
Bill 27 did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias at law. 121
In this regard, Watson J. held:
[I]t seems to me that part of the very purpose of such
tribunals is that the personnel sitting as adjudicators would
necessarily bring to the table not merely their human life
experience, but particular knowledge and experience about
issues and subjects, as well as the attitudes which necessarily
escort such knowledge and experience.
As for the apparent exchanges between Chair Asbell
and the Government during the period between the
launch of the policy review as to restructuring in January
2003, and the tabling and passage of Bill 27 in March 2003,
I am satisfied that there was no litigation in play at that
time such as would prevent Chair Asbell from being
consulted by the Government as to the practicalities of
what the Government was proposing to do. Accordingly, I
do not consider this a situation such as criticized in various
cases cited by HSAA and the Applicants: Szilard cited in
Newfoundland Telephone and Consolidated Bathurst; Ellis-
Don.122
Watson J. concluded:
In sum, the level of contact between Chair Asbell and the
Government, on the face of it, is not lower than a level of
generality that a reasonable person would assume might
possibly occur from time to time as between Government
and the head of a tribunal when legislation affecting that
tribunal is about to be tabled....
I stop well short of saying that anything goes in this
respect. In my view, specific Government contact with a
member of a tribunal about an issue then under specific
120 CEP, supra note 1 at para 214.
121 Supra note 1.
122 Ibid at paras 227, 231 [footnotes omitted].
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adjudication and affecting a specific party would be of
concern and could raise considerations such as argued
here: Tobiass; Ellis-Don. However, the matters raised here
do not persuade me that a reasonable person would find
such a disqualifying taint on the particular facts here. 123
Watson J.'s focus on the presence of actual or impending litigation
as a requirement of a finding of a breach of independence or
impartiality adopts a particularly narrow approach. Taken to its
logical conclusion, this view would suggest that any contact between
the Board and the Government on matters outside the context of
"specific adjudication...affecting a specific party" is acceptable as a
matter of law.
The real issue in these kinds of court cases, arguably, is the public
perception of a conflict of interest in the government's interest as a
party on the one hand, and its policy-making role on the other.
The government in this context has been recognized to have a
"significant interest" in the outcomes as well as the process of
interest arbitration in the health services field.124
Whether or not the involvement of the Chair and Vice Chair
in the development of Bill 27 in Alberta was unlawful, in our view,
it seems clear in view of the risk to public confidence that the
involvement of the Board in the legislative process was not
appropriate. The fact that the involvement of the Chair was not
disclosed at the time and the fact that the Government sought to
block disclosure subsequently could be a basis to infer that even the
Government and the Chair of the Board realized this was not proper.
This is not to suggest that there was no mechanism possible for the
Government if it wanted the view of the Board or its Chair on aspects
of the proposed legislation. The Government could have sought
input in a more open fashion, and at the same time explained why it
believed that it was important to have such a perspective. The
Government could have also used the opportunity of a more
open dialogue to reiterate that seeking such input from the Board or
its Chair was not intended to influence the Board's subsequent
consideration of the legislation in an adjudicative context.
123 Ibid at paras 235-236 [footnote omitted].
124 See the Supreme Court's observations in this regard in Retired Judges, supra note 89
at para 116 per Binnie J. At para 120 of his majority judgment in this case, Binnie
J. cited with approval the observations of Owen Shime, the labour arbitrator in Re
McMaster University and McMaster University Faculty Association (1990), 13 LAC
(4th) 199, [1990] OLAA No 84 (Ontario Labour Arbitration) at 204:
"Arbitrator/selectors have always maintained an independence from government
policies in public sector wage determinations and have never adopted positions
which would in effect make them agents of the government for the purpose of
imposing government policy."
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The propriety of the ALRB's role in Bill 27 raises questions of
accepted practices over time and across other Canadian jurisdictions.
As discussed below, this standard has been a shifting one but the
trend toward clearer and brighter lines between labour boards and
provincial governments is apparent.
Similarly, in Saskatchewan, the real damage caused by the
Government's use of its appointment power is to the credibility and
legitimacy of the Board. How can this loss of confidence be assessed
against a standard of the reasonable apprehension of bias? At what
point does the Board lose its ability to fairly adjudicate disputes? Public
confidence is not an absolute; it shifts over time and in response to
particular disputes or crises. Given the ambiguity surrounding the
appropriate, or at least accepted, relationship between boards, courts
and the Executive today, as illustrated in the examples discussed
above, we believe it is important to examine how these relations have
evolved over time. Within that context, we turn to the manner in
which labour board chairs have historically managed their professional
responsibilities over labour policy with duties of fairness, impartiality
and natural justice. We believe that this history will help shed light
on the ambiguous relationship between labour board chairs, labour
relations and government policy. It is to these experiences that we
now turn.
B. THE CONTEXT OF LABOUR BOARDS
When asked about the appropriateness of Labour Board members
having a role in the policy-making and/or legislative process, many
people familiar with the history of labour in Canada respond simply,
"It is not a matter of whether it is appropriate. It has always been this
way." Below we explore the experience most observers point to as
the first and most influential case of a labour board chair taking a
leadership role in the development of government labour policy.
1. Ontario: The Finkelman Experience
There is nothing controversial in the observation that labour boards
are inextricably linked to labour legislation and labour policy. Indeed,
the birth of labour boards in Canada was itself a product of a particular
policy and legislative initiative. In Ontario, the administration of
George Drew followed the lead of the federal wartime labour boards
and implemented a collective bargaining regime between 1943 and
1945.125 The first chair of the OLRB was University of Toronto law
professor Jacob Finkelman.
125 See Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, Labour Before the Law: The Regulation of Workers'
Collective Action in Canada, 1900-1948 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001),
272.
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As chair of the OLRB from 1945-49 and again from 1953-67,
Finkelman took painstaking steps to insulate the Board from hostile
Conservative back benchers or company lawyers eager to limit the
power of the OLRB from promoting (or even expanding) collective
bargaining rights for trade unions. For instance, in the early 1950s
Finkelman's Board was challenged by an Ontario High Court decision
that quashed an OLRB certification ruling based on the principles
of natural justice. 126 The Court's decision was controversial because
the Ontario Labour Relations Act (OLRA) contained a strongly worded
privative clause that was supposed to prevent judicial review of board
decisions. While the decision was, according to Finkelman, the
"closest" that the Government and the courts came to interfering in
the direct affairs of the Board, the steps taken by the Chairman after
the decision were meant to insulate, to all degrees possible, the Board
from direct interference by external actors. 127 Finkelman's reforms
sought to make all Board procedures compatible with three principles
of natural justice: i) the opportunity to be heard; ii) disclosure to the
parties of the facts and considerations upon which the Board bases its
decision; and iii) impartiality. 128 The incorporation of natural justice
into administrative tribunals (especially quasi-judicial boards such as
the OLRB) is generally considered the foundation of administrative
independence across the country.
The independence principle of the Board grew into a guiding
principle of the early labour relations community. By the late 1950s,
public questioning of the Chair of the OLRB on government policy
was deemed inappropriate. In 1957, for instance, when Ontario
Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) leader Donald
MacDonald asked Finkelman to comment on whether the OLRA was
"violating its own spirit" in allowing municipalities to opt out of the
Act, Finkelman responded:
...as Chairman of the Board I am prepared to answer any
questions on the policies of the Board and the reasons for
those policies. Those policies are not matters of government
policy. They are made by the Board and the Board will
accept responsibility for them and I will accept responsibility
for them. They are not the Minister's responsibility. On the
other hand, in the Department it has been my fortune or
126 Re Toronto Newspaper Guild, Local 87, American Newspaper Guild and Globe Printing
Company, [1951] 3 DLR 162 at page 178, [19511 OR 435.
127 See Finkelman comments in F David Millar, Shapes of Power: The Ontario Labour
Relations Board, 1944 to 1950 (PhD Thesis, York University, 1981) at 383-86.
128 Jacob Finkelman, The Ontario Labour Relations Board and Natural Justice (Kingston,
ON: Industrial Relations Centre Queen's University, 1965) at 2.
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misfortune to be associated for many years with the
drafting of this legislation, and as a civil servant my feeling
was that I should not be called upon as an individual to
express an opinion on government policy. I think that is a
matter which lies entirely within the province of the
Minister and I cannot express any opinion thereon. If Mr.
MacDonald wishes to ask any questions with relation to
the number of cases that have come before the Board and
in which municipalities have been involved and files have
been passed, and the number of cases for which files have
been opened, I will be glad to get him that information,
but, I cannot, I feel I should not, express opinions which
are political opinions of the Department and to which I
may be privy as a member of the Civil Service. 129
Of course, this did not leave the public service or the Labour Board free
from criticism. Speaking in the Ontario House of Commons in 1963,
Elmer Sopha, a Liberal from Sudbury, criticized the overly legalistic
approach to labour relations moulded by Finkelman, stating that he
knew that "the chairman of the labour relations board wrote the first
statute, the first Labour Relations Act that was offered within this
province,"1 30 and because of the chairman's close relationship with
the government, "he takes a much more active part in defending
the labour legislation than most deputy ministers in defending
legislation that is put forward by any other department."131
Finkelman's relationship with the government, while not overly
contentious, did vary over time. He was often called upon to comment
on future policy directions of the government, and was often present
in policy discussions regarding amendments to the OLRA. 132 Most of
these amendments were largely housekeeping in nature and, as such,
Finkelman's advice was largely sought on procedural grounds. This
distinction between involving the Board in "technical" or "housekeeping"
legislation but not on matters of substantive policy was common in
129 Testimony of Jacob Finkelman, Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Special Committee
on Labour Relations Act, Select Committee on Labor Relations (June 1957) at 190
(Chair: James Maloney). For the politics surrounding this committee, see Charles
W Smith, "Fairness and Balance": The Politics of Ontario's Labour Relations Regime,
1949-1963 (PhD Thesis, York University, 2009) at 216-84.
130 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 26th Leg, 4th
Sess, No 62 (21 March 1963) at 2054.
131 Ibid.
132 On the advice of Finkelman, an amendment was passed to provide for the succession
of bargaining rights in case of merger or amalgamation of certified unions following
the unification of the Trades and Labour Congress and the Canadian Congress of
Labour in 1956.
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this period.133 In no way, however, did the Chair of the OLRB feel
that this interaction compromised his independence. In 1959, for
instance, Walter Gordon, Chair of the Committee on the Organization
of Government in Ontario (the Gordon Commission), expressed
disappointment when Finkelman refused to answer substantive
questions on government policy. In particular, Finkelman refused to
comment on whether it was advisable for the OLRB to be able to
make decisions against which there was no provision for appeal. Said
Finkelman, "[i]t's a matter of policy over which the OLRB has no
jurisdiction," 134 and then asked to be excused from answering it.
Gordon responded by stating he was very disappointed "that you
didn't feel it proper to express a view on it."13 5
These early examples set the precedent for how modern labour
boards operate. There is room, of course, for board personnel to advise
or seek advice from government. But Finkelman made it clear that
such advice never crossed the jurisdictional boundaries in which labour
boards operate. Finkelman's behaviour seemed to correspond to the
view of George Adams, a future OLRB chair, that the comprehensive
jurisdiction "permits a labour relations board to be seen in the labour
relations community as a protector of the respective interests of both
unions and management and, thereby, contributes to the moral
authority of the tribunal and the acceptability of its legal policies."1 36
These guiding principles have entrenched a doctrine of independence
between the legitimate policy role of labour board chairs and their
role in aiding the government in shaping labour legislation. While
Finkelman's advice was seen as crucial in the early years of labour
relations law, by the late 1950s a clear dividing line had emerged. In
Ontario, this hands-off approach continued with Finkelman's
successors G.W.T Reed, Ted Armstrong and George Adams. While the
appointment of Rosalie Abella in 1985 may have ended the neutral
ground between labour boards and the courts (Abella, was after all,
a sitting judge at the time), it only entrenched the doctrine of
independence from government interference.
2. British Columbia: The Weiler Experience
In British Columbia, to take another notable example, the British
Columbia Labour Relations Board (BCLRB) under the chairmanship
of Paul Weiler between 1973-78 was given jurisdiction over collective
bargaining (the traditional role of boards) but also the adjudicative
133 Smith, supra note 129.
134 "Gordon Disappointed," The Globe and Mail (23 January 1959) 4.
135 Ibid.
136 George W Adams, Canadian Labour Law, A Comprehensive Text (Canada Law
Textbook, 1985) at 225.
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functions of arbitration and the regulation of strike and picketing
behaviour that was usually under the purview of the courts. 137 The
amalgamation of these functions, Weiler has argued, gave the Board
administrative autonomy from overt government intervention and
judicial tinkering. 138 Under this model, if "the Labour Board is to be
effective in the fray, it must be seen by the labour-management
community as the body with the final authority on labour law."1 39
Under B.C.'s first NDP government, the Weiler Board was widely
seen by experts as fiercely independent, as Labour Minister Bill King
had insisted on a non-partisan attempt to mediate the conflicting
sides of B.C.'s tense labour-management community. Weiler stated
that it was the Labour Minister's view that "polarization of labour law
reform had to stop if there was to be a real chance of moderating the
level of conflict on the ground." 140 The most important way to
address the systemic conflict, King insisted during second reading of
the new labour bill, was for a new structure, function and philosophy
at the Board. Under King's legislation, the Board "is completely
independent, not only in fact but in appearance. Under [the new
code], the chairman is granted legislative tenure for five years and he
can only be removed by address of the Legislative Assembly. So this
secures the position of the chairman of the new board as independent
and not susceptible to any political pressures that might otherwise
be the case." 141 King further went on to address the importance of
impartiality, flexibility and expertise in adjudicating industrial
conflict in the province.
Yet, while the B.C. NDP's labour code was widely heralded by
labour experts as being the most far reaching of its time, initially
business and labour were critical of the new legislation and the
newfound powers of the Board. 142 For business groups, the NDP
legislation simply represented a violation of the free market principles
long endorsed by the opposition Social Credit Party. The labour
movement was wary of some of the new remedial powers given to the
Board, especially its ability to impose first contracts in the event that
an agreement could not be reached between an employer and a
newly certified union. According to Harry Arthurs, this section
137 Paul C Weiler, "The Administrative Tribunal: A View from the Inside" (1976) 26
UTLJ 193 at 197-98 [Weiler, "A View from the Inside"].
138 Paul C Weiler, Reconcilable Differences: New Directions in Canadian Labour Law
(Toronto: Carswell, 1980) at 299 [Weiler, Reconcilable Differences].
139 Ibid [emphasis in original].
140 Ibid at 6.
141 British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 30th
Parl, 3rd Sess, Vol 1 No 15 (3 October 1973) at 396 (Hon WS King).
142 HW Arthurs, "'The Dullest Bill': Reflections on the Labour Code of British
Columbia" (1974) 9 UBC L Rev 280 at 318.
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represented a "sharp departure from the traditional NDP philosophy
that the outcome of collective bargaining should be determined by
an economic contest, rather than by legal intervention." 143
The "departure from NDP philosophy" also led the labour
movement to criticize Weiler's selection as Chair. As a visiting
scholar at the University of British Columbia, Weiler was instrumental
in drafting the new legislation, including the functions of the
new BCLRB. 144 Unions also believed that the appointment of a law
professor (and not a labour member) would inevitably lead to a board
that favoured employers. Building on this critique, the B.C.
Federation of Labour was also critical of the new labour code's
underlying theme of balance and compromise, which gave the Board
power to settle disputes "through the promotion of effective
industrial relations." 145 For some of the unions, this was code for
limiting the collective rights of workers in favour of employers.
Over the next three years, however, the B.C. NDP's strategy of
separating the administrative sides of collective bargaining and
labour relations from the government and the courts implanted the
Board with an institutional legitimacy. According to Weiler, the
BCLRB's expanded jurisdiction, the broad expertise of its members
and its new procedural powers "minimize[d] the use of the formal
legal approach in labour relations in which lawyers throw 'rights' and
'duties' at each other." 146 These structural changes allowed the Board
to address disputes quickly, experiment with new problem solving
techniques, and, if need be, pass judgment on economic disputes
between unions and employers. Since the Board was given purview
over all aspects of industrial relations, it developed an expertise and
institutional legitimacy amongst its participants. Perhaps just as
importantly, the reforms fashioned a more transparent relationship
with the legislature in which governments could quickly respond to
situations through legislative amendment if they disagreed with a
Board decision or policy. In this context, Weiler believed that "there
has been an ongoing dialogue between the board and the legislature
in the refinement of labour law policy, a dialogue which it would be
difficult if not impossible to duplicate with the judiciary." 147
According to Weiler, the newfound transparency and independence
at the Board gained support from both heavily unionized employers
and, just as importantly, the provincial labour movement. This
143 Ibid at 291.
144 Weiler, Reconcilable Differences, supra note 138 at 4.
145 Wilfred List, "BC labor code is most innovative in Canada," Globe and Mail (8
December 1975) 8.
146 Weiler, "A View from the Inside," supra note 137 at 203.
147 Ibid at 210.
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assisted in saving the Labour Code from being radically dismantled
by the Social Credit Party when it returned to office in 1975.148 What
seemed to be consistent about the NDP reforms implemented by
the Weiler BCLRB was a commitment to the idea that if the basic
principles of collective bargaining and the right to strike could be
agreed to, then an independent board could act to mediate the
intense struggle between labour and management.
3. The Evolving Importance of Independence in the
Labour Board Context
By the 1980s, direct involvement by government in the operation or
decision-making of labour boards was widely seen as compromising
the independence of board decision-making. The importance of this
principle became clear in Saskatchewan in the 1980s when the SLRB
seemed to be taking an overt "government line" in deciding cases.
In one instance, Conservative appointment Dennis Ball ruled
that Canada Safeway Ltd. management could change wages and
working conditions in an expired contract without the union's
consent despite a section in the province's TUA that would make it
illegal for an employer to take such action without the consent of the
union. 149 In 1986, similar cries were heard from Alberta when the
AFL cited a "conservative climate" of labour board decision-making
for de-legitimizing the entire system of post-war labour relations.150
By the mid-1980s, many provinces were willing to openly
eliminate collective bargaining procedures (and end legal strikes) in
order to combat budgetary and economic crises. 151 Throughout this
period, many governments claimed that the move away from free
collective bargaining would be temporary measures, although as Leo
Panitch and Donald Swartz have demonstrated, many of these
measures were soon entrenched as permanent policy. 152 Similar
trends continued throughout the 1990s and 2000s. In Ontario, the
148 Ibid at 7-9.
149 Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union, Locals 454 and 480 v Canada Safeway
Ltd (1986), 37:3 Sask Labour Report 23 at 32-36 (SLRB); Lorne Slotnick, "Labour
Board rankles Saskatchewan unions," The Globe and Mail (19 April 1986) 8; see also
Ian McCuaig, Bob Sass & Mark Stobbe, "Labour Pains: The Birth of a New
Industrial Relations Order in Saskatchewan 1982-1990" in Lesley Biggs & Mark
Stobbe, eds, Devine Rule in Saskatchewan: A Decade of Hope and Hardship
(Saskatoon: Fifth House, 1991) 153-56.
150 Lorne Slotnick, "Alberta unions take aim at labor laws, but roots of trouble run
much deeper," The Globe and Mail (19 June 1986) 3.
151 See generally Mark Thompson, Joseph B Rose & Anthony E Smith, eds, Beyond the
National Divide: Regional Dimensions of Industrial Relation (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 2003).
152 Leo Panitch & Donald Swartz, From Consent to Coercion: The Assault on Trade Union
Freedoms, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Garamond, 2003).
Transparency and Independence 47
Progressive Conservative government of Mike Harris unilaterally
dismissed OLRB personnel whom it deemed too close to the previous
NDP administration. 15 3 That dismissal, which led to the case in
Hewat (discussed above), tainted the Board's ability to act as an
independent body, especially given the hostility of the government
towards organized labour.154 These tensions escalated when the
Tories stripped the OLRB of its remedial certification powers in 1998
after the Board made a certification decision at a Windsor
Walmart. 155 Although the Liberals removed many of the restrictions
imposed by the Tories after 2003, the Board has never regained the
full remedial powers that it had before 1995.156
Notwithstanding the changes in Ontario, we maintain that the
few exceptions to the open embrace of neo-liberal industrial relations
policies in Canada has been the continued reliance on tripartite
boards to regulate certification procedures while being the ultimate
arbitrator of collective bargaining disputes. To be sure, it is problematic
that governments continue to take coercive action to end strikes or
even eliminate collective bargaining rights for (mainly public sector)
workers. Yet, the boards themselves have remained a permanent
fixture in the industrial relations setting because they continue to
maintain the non-partisan legitimacy built by reformers like
Finkelman and Weiler. For both unions and employers, labour boards
are a neutral body to mediate certification, collective bargaining and
strike disputes. Or, to be more candid, while the labour boards and
their members are empowered to interpret government legislation,
they do so as:
professional adjudicators who [are] prepared to (and
indeed bound to) implement any duly-enacted legislation,
regardless of their personal views. This [is] not just a matter
of integrity; it [is] also a statutory duty, as the Interpretation
Act makes clear
... this professional fidelity to the legislation passed by any
government is a central tenet of the theory of tribunal
independence. 157
153 Hewat, supra note 85.
154 See Flood, supra note 86; on the Harris reforms, see Panitch & Swartz, supra note
152 at 191.
155 On this issue, see John Stout and Jo-Anne Pickel, "The Wal-Mart Waltz in Canada:
Two Steps Forward, One Step Back" (2007) 39:4 Conn L Rev 1493 at 1499-1502.
156 See Timothy J Bartkiw, "Manufacturing Descent? Labour Law and Union
Organizing in the Province of Ontario" (2008) 34 Can Pub Pol'y 111 at 113.
157 Judith McCormack, "Comment on 'The Politicization of the Ontario Labour
Relations Framework in the 1990s"' (1999) 7 CLELJ 325 at 343.
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In practice, Canadian labour boards have been able to maintain this
independence because governments, with a few notable exceptions,
have not been willing to openly dismantle the administrative side
of labour relations. Governments have not taken these steps because
boards maintain such a high degree of respect amongst both
employers and unions. This brief review of the history of the role of
labour boards in the development of labour policy and legislation
reveals significant changes over time. There are several reasons for
these changes.
First, since the end of WWII the role of government in labour
relations was changing. Governments across the country became
interested in labour policy goals beyond merely the creation of a
credible and effective mode of dispute resolution and peace between
employers and workers. In this period, government policy protected
the principles of "exclusivity" and "majoritarianism," giving unions
the absolute right to bargain collectively, strike, and organize in
individual job sites once certain conditions have been met. 158
Second, governments used their appointment power to fill labour
boards with individuals trusted to adopt similar views on labour
policy to the government of the day. One of the reasons few raised
concerns about the roles of people like Jacob Finkelman and Paul
Weiler in the development of labour policy was the confidence of
stakeholders in the independent judgment of non-partisan experts
(Harry Arthurs might be put in a similar category). Confidence in the
merit basis of appointments to a labour board and perceptions of
independence are intertwined. Where governments appoint individuals
to labour boards known or believed to share a government's own
perspective on labour policy, the credibility of the board may be
eroded. Third, administrative law standards evolved (particularly in
the period of 1979-95), the rules of natural justice expanding to
embrace institutional impartiality and independence as norms of
fairness (see the discussion above).
These factors have resulted in a significant shift in how relations
between government and labour boards are viewed in Canada. Levels
of contact between board chairs and government that were commonplace
in the 1950s had become unacceptable by the 1980s and 1990s. This
raises the question of what legitimate role, if any, labour boards may
today play in the policy-making process. It is to this question that we
now turn.
158 Fraser v Ontario (Attorney General), 2008 ONCA 760, [2009] 92 OR (3d) 481.
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C. WHAT IS THE EXTENT OF A LABOUR BOARD'S
LEGITIMATE ROLE, IF ANY, IN THE POLICY-MAKING
PROCESS GENERALLY?
In light of the above analysis of the legal and historical backdrop, we
now turn to address the key question of what the relationship
between an adjudicative board and the government ought to be.
Labour boards perform adjudicative functions but do so in the service
of policy goals. The primary policy goal, however, remains impartial
and informal dispute resolution based on expertise in labour relations,
rooted in mutual acceptability of employer and union groups.
While visible guideposts may be elusive, it is clear that the nature
of adjudicative functions constrains the extent to which board members
legitimately may be involved in the shaping of policy goals. Because
a labour board is not a court, but rather a part of the executive branch,
it is impossible to conclude that it should never be part of the policy-
making process. In our view, it is preferable to see the involvement of
the board in the policy or legislative process in terms of a burden of
justification rather than in terms of bright lines. In other words, the
involvement of board members in a policy-making process that is
perceived as partisan creates a prima facie perception that the board
will not be able to adjudicate disputes under the resulting policies or
legislation in a disinterested and impartial fashion. This prima facie
perception creates a burden of justification both on government and the
labour board to account for how this relationship does not undermine
the impartiality and independence of the board. Below, we discuss
specific factors that might legitimize such a role for board members.
First, transparency might legitimize the involvement of the
board in policy-making. One of the central differences between
tribunals and courts is the fact that tribunals often have the power
to engage in policy-making while courts do not.159 Labour boards
themselves develop public policy and, as noted above, the ALRB was
in the process of a policy initiative in the area of restructuring the
health services sector at the time Bill 27 was announced. Where the
government wishes to legislate in areas in which a board is already
active in developing policy, it may be justified to involve the board in
some fashion in developing the legislation.
The board's process of policy development typically is a transparent
one, based on inviting submissions from various stakeholders and
interested parties. If the involvement of the board in the legislative
process is transparent as well, and would survive scrutiny by unions
and employer representatives, this is one indication that the board's
involvement might be legitimate.
159 See Francis Houle & Lorne Sossin, "Tribunals and guidelines: Exploring the
relationship between fairness and legitimacy in administrative decision-making"
(2006) 42 Canadian Public Administration 282 at 304.
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Second, several jurisdictions have labour statutes which give the
Minister of Labour (or the government) the express power to refer
questions to labour boards which relate to ministerial powers and
how they are exercised. Alberta has now adopted such guidelines in
the wake of the Bill 27 controversy. The existence of such provisions
suggests that where such reference jurisdiction is available, it may be
an appropriate mechanism by which to involve the board in a policy
initiative. If the Legislature wishes for the government to be able to
avail itself of the expertise of the board, there is no reason why it
should not provide clear statutory legitimacy for so doing, in which
case the transparency of that consultation is assured and the
independence of the board is preserved.
Third, whether the independence and impartiality of a labour
board is undermined by involvement in a legislative initiative may
depend on the content of the initiative. For example, if the legislation
is "technical" or of a "housekeeping" (or procedural) nature, consulting
with the board may pose less of a problem than when the legislation
is substantive and perceived by unions or employers to affect its
interests in material ways. However, this is a line that is inexorably
difficult to draw and often in the eye of the beholder. Consider the
example of a proposal for the board to charge user fees for adjudicative
services. On the one hand, this could be seen as a procedural change
with little consequence for substantive labour rights. However, others
may view it as fundamentally altering the access to the board and
privatizing dispute resolution, with adverse consequences for labour.
Fourth, there is an important distinction relating to the depth
of involvement in the legislative initiative. If the chair or vice chair
of a labour board is asked to review draft legislation with a view to
identifying unintended consequences or problematic language, this
is unlikely to raise the same concerns as where the chair or vice chair
is asked to draft the legislation or to shape the policy preferences that
the legislation seeks to advance. For this reason, the determination of
the appropriateness of a board member's involvement in a policy
process will be contextual and should be considered on a case-by-case
basis.
Fifth, as part of that contextual analysis, it is necessary to distinguish
between a government that seeks an independent view on legislation
from the chair of a labour board and a government that seeks to
involve the chair so as to influence the interpretations the board is
likely to give legislation. The motivation of the Ontario government's
consultations with Finkelman in the 1950s was to enhance the
credibility of its early foray into labour relations; this motivation
contributes to why so few observers then or now look back on that
involvement as problematic. The motivation for the consultation
with the board member, in other words, is significant.
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Similarly, signposts are needed to clarify the legitimate mechanisms
by which a government may remove or appoint board members to
align with their own policy perspectives or goals. These signposts
may come in the form of government regulations or guidelines, or by
the government delegating the appointment power to an independent
committee or commission. The events in Saskatchewan (and Ontario
under Premier Harris) demonstrate that the arbitrary dismissal of
labour board members risks undermining the independence, and
ultimately the legitimacy, of the labour relations process.
IV. CONCLUSION
Labour boards are creatures of the executive branch of government.
They are appointed and funded by the executive and may be 'subject
to executive-led procedures, practices and policies. Labour boards are
also adjudicative bodies that enjoy, at common law, institutional
independence and impartiality. This independence and impartiality
requirement, however, is not a protection of the board. It is, rather, a
protection of those who come before the board. This legal standard
should serve not as a minimum standard, but as a catalyst for a culture
of adjudicative integrity, propriety and transparency. As these are
common law and not constitutional guarantees, it remains open to
the legislature, if it wishes, to restrict or modify the independence
and impartiality of the board. But until and unless it does, those
constraints limit the activities and consultations in which board
members can appropriately engage.
There is no clear rule of practice in Canadian jurisdictions on
board involvement in the policy or legislative process, but there is, we
would suggest, an evolving consensus on this issue. The relationship
between labour boards and provincial governments has been evolving,
from a period of time in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s when close
contacts appeared not to have been uncommon and rarely to have
generated controversy, to the 1980s and 1990s when one finds fewer
instances of this kind of involvement and more controversy associated
with it. Together, these factors suggest increased risks of board
involvement in government legislative and policy initiatives. Even
where legal standards have not been breached expressly, such
commingling of the board in adjudicative and policy-related activities
appears more difficult to justify than it might have been in the past.
In commenting on the renewed interest in appointments and
independence, David Mullan offered the following observation:
Especially critical in recent litigation have been issues of
the impact on independence of government proposals to
change the composition of tribunals either by non-
renewal of expiring appointments or even dismissal. The
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early case law in this domain rejected such challenges
on the basis that those seeking renewal would realize that
the government of the day would be looking at their
performance in terms of their overall discharge of their
duties in terms of the general philosophy and dictates of
the empowering statute. It was simply inappropriate to
presume that members of a tribunal might act in such a
way as to favour government interests in particular cases in
order to enhance their chances of reappointment. More
recently, confronted by the specter of governments blatantly
and unapologetically using their powers of appointment,
reappointment... and dismissal to achieve political ends
aid political rebalancing, such arguments are now making
some headway. 160
A focus on independence must, in our view, concentrate on the
broader context of appointments decision making. It is not simply a
matter of security of tenure, financial independence or control over
administration-though these are clearly important guarantees-but
also a question of transparency. Those affected by tribunal decision
making have a right to expect an independent hearing before an
independent adjudicator. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Ocean Port, Mullan speculated that the independence principle from
the Provincial Judges Remuneration Referencel 61 could apply to tribunals
as well: "If the Preamble can be deployed to challenge compromises
of independence in the case of non-section 96 judges, it is not much
of a stretch to extend that to adjudication by tribunals." 162
While the Supreme Court adopted a different approach in Ocean
Port, this does not preclude the notion that administrative law
imposes constraints on the government's appointment power. One
type of constraint is the limit on ministerial discretion developed and
applied in the context of appointments in the Retired Judges case,
discussed above. Another type of constraint, in our view, must
remain tied to the notion of independence. This must be an approach
to independence tailored to the diverse and distinctive sphere of
administrative justice, not one grafted from the judicial context.
All adjudication must be premised on protections ensuring that
the outcome of decision-making is determined on the merits. Only
decision-makers appointed on a merit-based system of appointment
160 David J Mullan, Administrative Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) at 346.
161 Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island,
[1997] 3 SCR 3, 150 DLR (4th) 1997 at 577.
162 Mullan, supra note 160 at 347.
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can truly ensure this outcome. As Supreme Court Justice Rosalie
Abella has observed, "tt]he public will only have confidence in
tribunals if they have confidence that they are not seen as the
dumping grounds for post-electoral rewards." 163 Integrating
appointments within a culture of adjudicative independence for
tribunals, like clarifying the involvement boards appropriately may
have in government policy making, would together represent a
significant step toward ensuring public confidence in administrative
justice in Canada.
163 Rosalie Silberman Abella, "Canadian Administrative Tribunals: Toward
Judicialization or Dejudicialization?" (1988) 2 Can J Admin L & Prac 1 at 10.
